Theconceptofattitudewasacentralthemewhensocial
psychology emerged, and it is one of the field's major topics today (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) . Attitudes are commonly viewed as "evaluative summaries" (Fazio, 1989, p. 155) in relation to entities (persons, objects, behaviors). Allport (1935) took the view that attitudes are one of the most powerful determinants of behavior and, therefore, are an indispensable construct for understanding and predicting human judgment and decision making. This notion dominated during the rise of social psychology and henceforth has motivated a considerable amount of research on attitude formation and change.
In the early days of attitude research, psychologists were still interested in the unconscious processes underlying attitude formation. It was investigated, for instance, whether attitudes can be established by classical conditioning (Staats & Staats, 1958) . With the fall of behaviorism in the middle of the last century, cognitive processes shifted into the focus of attention in all areas of psychology. Subsequent research spotlighted mainly the explicit part of cognition; that is, processes that can be mentally controlled and verbalized by the subjects. Theories emerged that described attitude change in terms of an expectancy-value model, a notion that closely dovetails with the subjective-expected-utility approach in decision research (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1974; Rosenberg, 1956; Wyer, 1973) . Subsequent approaches, such as the dual-process models (e.g., Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986 ) placed more emphasis on shortcut strategies in attitude formation but still focused primarily on explicit processes.
Experimental evidence, however, shows that explicit processes are only one side of the coin. Many cognitive operations occur automatically (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) and cannot be accessed by introspection (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) . This insight directed contemporary research in social psychology back to the implicit processes involved in judgment and behavior (Bargh, 1994; Green-wald & Banaji, 1995; Uleman & Bargh, 1989) . Implicit processes have been studied in attitude research (e.g., Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000) , stereotyping (e.g., Devine, 1989; Dovidio, Evans, & Tyler, 1986) , self-esteem research (e.g., Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984) , and other domains of social cognition (see Greenwald & Banaji, 1995, for an overview) .
The present article joins in line with this development in social cognition and investigates the processes of implicit online formation of attitudes. In the remainder of the article, we consider a situation in which the individual encounters an unfamiliar target object. The encounter episode provides a stream of value-charged information about the target. By "value-charged," we mean that the stimuli obtain the potential to provokeat least to some degree-positive or negative reactions in the individual. The chief question is whether and how such streams of value-charged stimuli contribute to attitude formation if the individual does not intend to explicitly evaluate the target object during the encounter episode.
We conducted three experiments to test three hypotheses that together constitute our value-account approach to implicit attitude formation. First, we assume that the encoding of value-charged stimuli is a sufficient condition to initiate implicit online formation of an attitude about the target. Second, we claim that this process is summative. Accordingly, the intensities of the positive or negative responses evoked by the stimuli in the organism are thought to be accumulated and stored in a unitary memory structure. We term this hypothetical memory structure value account. The value account is thought to provide a summary evaluation that subsequently can serve as a basis to form an attitude judgment about the target. Third, we assume that a value account is more easily accessible in memory than are concrete traces of past experiences. Therefore, attitude judgments should be based on value accounts, especially if cognitive capacities are constrained (e.g., due to time pressure).
The first and second assumptions rest on some robust and frequently documented findings from research in experimental psychology. There is ample evidence that memory is capable of automatically recording fundamental aspects of experience, for example, the frequency of events (Hasher & Zacks, 1984) . Consequently, frequency estimations reveal a high degree of accuracy (Sedlmeier, 1999) , especially if a relevant coding category has been focused on during encoding (Betsch, Siebler, Marz, Hormuth, & Dickenberger, 1999) . Affective reactions in the organism are probably one of the most important aspects of experience. Not surprisingly, organisms are especially sensitive to the frequency of value-charged experiences (Thorndike, 1898; Wolfe & Kaplon, 1941) . These and similar results underline the assumption that the cognitive apparatus is designed to implicitly perform accumulative operations online (Gallistel, 1990) . Moreover, recent and classical studies in animal choice revealed that the organism also is able to register the intensities of value-charged experiences (Davis, Staddon, Machado, & Palmer, 1993; Hull, 1943) . Experiments 1 and 2 will test the notion that individuals are able to implicitly accumulate intensities of values and not only the frequency of value-charged experiences. The idea that integration of information works in a summative fashion contradicts the assumptions of at least some models applied in attitude formation research. For example, Anderson (1971 Anderson ( , 1981 ) made a strong case for averaging as a central mechanism in information integration. Therefore, Experiment 2 will contrast the summation hypothesis with alternative notions of information integration.
The third assumption to be tested in Experiment 3 is quite straightforward if one considers what we know about the conditions under which the quality and quantity of memories influence subsequent judgment. In general, one could expect that once an attitude has been formed online, people often simply retrieve this attitude rather than forming a new one each time when they have to reevaluate an object (Hastie & Park, 1986) . Furthermore, it does not necessitate effortful inferences to retrieve an established evaluation from memory (Zajonc, 1980) . The activation of the attitude object often suffices to activate a stored evaluation as well (Fazio, 1989; Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999) . However, people do not always rely on stored evaluations. For example, if they are motivated to be accurate in their judgments, they might deliberate on concrete arguments and finally arrive at a new attitude. Such a deliberative process of attitude formation obviously requires time for information search, evaluation, and integration. In turn, under time pressure, one would expect that individuals are not likely to form an attitude in a deliberative fashion but rather to rely on an already established evaluation (Fazio, 1989) . Results from research on frequency judgment converge with such a notion. In our own studies, we could demonstrate that individuals are most likely to rely on online, formed frequency records under time constraints (Haberstroh, Betsch, & Aarts, 2000) . EXPERIMENT 1 The first experiment tests the hypotheses (a) that encoding of value-charged stimuli is a sufficient condition to initiate implicit online formation of an attitude about the target object and (b) that this process is summative.
Method STIMULUS MATERIAL
A strict test of the hypotheses requires a research paradigm that allows (a) a precise quantification of values conveyed by the stimuli and (b) a maximum of control over the learning process to avoid that participants explicitly form an attitude when receiving value-charged information about the target.
An effective manipulation of the distribution of values basically requires that numeric values be assigned to each outcome on a particular outcome dimension. Moreover, subjective evaluation of the outcomes should be likely to form a monotonically increasing function over the a priori value scale used in the experiment. This simply means that increasing objective scale values should lead to an increase in the participant's subjective values (more-is-better principle). Violations of monotonicity are likely to occur if multiple goals are involved (e.g., Keeney, 1981) . With respect to the requirement of quantifiability and to reduce the likelihood that multiple goals interfere, we decided to use shares as attitude objects in our experiments, which are mainly associated with one outcome dimension, namely, profit. On the operational level, the a priori value of an outcome is quantified as a particular increase of the share's price (return) on a stock exchange. Obviously, another advantage of choosing this judgment domain is that return distributions can be easily varied to achieve differences in the sum of values.
The stimulus material consisted of five shares that differed with respect to their sum of return values. Participants were sequentially presented with return information of the shares in random order. In addition, they were informed that a return value (in deutschmarks [DM]) does not represent the absolute price of the share but rather an increase in value compared to the previous trading date. Frequency of appearance and peak and bottom values were kept identical for all shares. Specifically, 15 returns were reported for each share. The bottom and the peak values were 10 and 55 DM, respectively. The end values of the return distributions were similar and varied between 30 and 35 DM for all shares. However, the shares differed markedly with regard to their sums of returns (300, 400, 500, 600, 700 DM).
To maximize the effectiveness of the learning procedure, we first tried to reduce the influence of prior knowledge. In the experimental presentation, the shares were labeled with names that, according to pretests, did not systematically differ in familiarity and affective quality (i.e., RONAT, ELSKAR, FAMO, NARWIG, PATEL). Second, we asked participants to read the stimulus information aloud to ensure that all of the return values were encoded. The return values appeared in random order on a running caption on a computer screen. Third, to reduce the likelihood that participants explicitly form online judgments during the presentation, we obscured the true objective of the study and directed the participant's attention toward distracting aspects of the task. For this purpose, we additionally presented ads on the computer screen that were electronically scanned from common public journals. The ads changed consecutively every 5 secs. Participants were asked to focus their attention primarily on the ads.
PARTICIPANTS AND DESIGN
Twenty students (9 men, 11 women; M age = 24.3 years) of different majors at the University of Heidelberg volunteered for an experiment titled "consumer research" in return for two paperback books. We varied the sum of return values (in DEM) of the shares as a within-subjects factor on five levels (RONAT: 300, ELSKAR: 400, FAMO: 500, NARWIG: 600, PATEL: 700).
PROCEDURE
The complete experiment was controlled by a computer program written in Visual Basic. Participants were seated in front of a personal computer (PC) screen. They were told that the objective of the study was to investigate their capability of memorizing pictorial ads while being distracted by information about shares. They were instructed to primarily concentrate on the ads because they would have to answer memory questions concerning ads later. In addition, they were requested to simultaneously read the share information appearing on the running caption aloud. Before the presentation was started, participants had to address some questions about their attitudes toward ads to let them practice the use of the interactive devices of the computer dialogue that were later used to measure the dependent variables (i.e., a multiple-choice table, a scroll bar, and a numberpad). After this introductory task, the stimulus material was presented. The presentation contained 75 pieces of return information (15 per share) and 60 different ads; it lasted about 10 minutes. Subsequently, participants had to answer 30 multiple-choice questions concerning the ads. The reason for this part of the procedure was (a) to keep in line with the cover story and (b) to extinguish concrete memories about single returns that could have been available directly after the presentation of the return information.
Then the dependent measures were assessed. Specifically, participants were requested to evaluate each of the five shares and to estimate sum and average of each of the five return distributions. Attitudes toward the shares were assessed by means of a vertical scroll bar with the endpoints labeled very good at the top and very bad at the bottom. The scroll bar appeared for each share on a separate screen and people were asked to give spontane-ous answers to the question, "How do you find this share?" (in German, "Wie finden Sie diese Aktie?"). Afterward, participants were asked to estimate the sum and average of returns for each share by means of a numberpad presented simultaneously on the screen. Finally, participants were probed for suspicion in a postexperimental interview and were fully debriefed.
Results
The postexperimental interviews revealed that none of the participants was suspicious about the ostensible purpose of the experiment. Thus, all of the 20 cases were entered into subsequent analyses. We obtained no effects for gender and age.
ATTITUDE JUDGMENTS
Attitude judgments ranged from -5 (very bad) to +5 (very good). Table 1 includes mean attitude judgments for each of the five shares. The judgments were subjected to a simple ANOVA with the five shares as a repeated measurement factor. The ANOVA revealed a highly significant effect, F(4, 76) = 5.25, p < .01, showing that participants could clearly differentiate between the five shares in their attitude judgments. Moreover, attitude judgments perfectly corresponded to the sum of returns of the shares (cf. Table 1 ). For example, PATEL, with the largest sum of 700 DEM, received the most positive response (M = 2.20) and RONAT, with the lowest sum of 300 DEM, was judged the least positive (M = 0.05).
ESTIMATION OF SUM AND AVERAGE
Participants were asked to estimate the sum of returns and the average return for each of the shares. The mean estimation ratings also are included in Table 1 . Both kinds of estimations were analyzed using a simple ANOVA with shares as a within-subject factor. No significant effect was obtained (both Fs < 1.5), which means that participants were not able to differentiate between the shares regarding sums and averages of returns. The mean estimation ratings did not correspond at all to the real differences of the shares' sum of returns (cf. Table 1 ). Pairwise Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated for the estimation of sum of returns and the estimation of the average return with the attitude judgment for each of the five shares. No coefficient involving the attitude judgment differed significantly from a zero correlation (all ps > .25).
Discussion
Attitude judgments reflected a remarkable degree of sensitivity to the sum of values of previously encoded information, although participants did not intend to form an attitude judgment online. The results corroborate the hypothesis that encoding of value-charged stimuli is a sufficient condition to prompt a process by which values are implicitly summed up online and stored in memory. Note that the frequencies of positive stimuli (returns of money) were identical for all objects (shares). Therefore, the effect cannot be due to a mere accumulation of return frequencies. Moreover, the perfect rank order correlation between the actual sum of returns and the attitude judgments support the assumption that the implicitly established value accounts in memory can reflect the whole history of previous experiences.
The possibility that the results stem from an explicit calculation of sums during encoding is not tenable: Share returns were presented as distractor information in a task in which participants had to focus on attentiongrabbing, pictorial ads and were expecting to answer questions concerning these ads later. Furthermore, participants had to sequentially encode 75 pieces of return information that were not blocked per share but rather occurred in random order. These circumstances made it very difficult to sum up return values explicitly during encoding. In fact, all participants in the postexperimental interviews confirmed our own impression that it is simply impossible to calculate any statistics during encoding in this paradigm. The results of the memory measures empirically substantiated this notion. They showed that participants were not able to reliably estimate sums or averages of the five return distributions. EXPERIMENT 2 The results of the previous study still allow for an alternative interpretation of the underlying mechanism of implicit information integration. Due to the constraints set up by the manipulation to keep frequency of returns and peak and bottom values constant over shares, an increase of the sum of outcomes entailed an increase in the average. Hence, we cannot rule out the possibility that people might have been implicitly sensitive to the average of the return distributions rather than being sensitive to their sum. Information integration theory (e.g., Anderson, 1981) , which is among the most influential integration accounts in attitude research, assumes that attitudes reflect the weighted average of the input scale values. A series of recent articles Kahnemann, Fredrickson, Schreiber, & Redelmeier, 1993; Redelmeier & Kahnemann, 1996) demonstrated that retrospective evaluations of affective episodes are predicted fairly well by a special version of the averaging model, the so-called peak-and-end rule. Accordingly, people are assumed to base their evaluative judgments of past episodes on a limited number of outstanding events, such as the peak and end experiences. The peak-andend heuristic can be considered a special version of the averaging rule in which the peak and end experiences are positively and equally weighted and the other experiences are assigned zero weights.
With the second experiment, we tried to replicate the previous findings and to out-rule the alternative interpretation by avoiding a confounding of sum and average in the return distributions. Moreover, we considered mere exposure, frequency of positive outcomes, and peak of outcome values to assess the relative impact of sum and average of values on implicit attitude formation.
Method STIMULUS MATERIAL
The experimental paradigm was virtually the same as in the previous study. We only replaced the pictorial ads by videotaped TV ads to render the distractor material more attention grabbing. The pay-off matrix of the shares, however, was substantially changed. We varied the features of the return distributions in such a way that a certain target share dominates the others with respect to a single relevant feature. For instance, one share had the largest sum but was dominated by the others if one considers another feature, such as exposure frequency or average. For convenience, we henceforth label a share after that feature by which it dominates the others (SUM, FREQUENCY, AVERAGE, PEAK, EXPOSE). Using this method, the relevant factors compete against each other at the same time. Their influence can be easily assessed by comparing the attitude judgments to the shares within subjects. For instance, if the sum of values is the dominant factor in implicit attitude formation, SUM should receive the most positive attitude judgment.
To construct such distributions, we had to include neutral outcome information, for instance, to manipulate mere exposure frequency without associating a particular return value with the share's name. Accordingly, and in deviation from the previous experiment, either a positive return value or a note, indicating that return information is not available (neutral information) appeared together with the share's name. The participants were told in a cover story that the partial lack of return information was due to incomplete archive data.
The left side of Table 2 shows the structure of the return distributions of six target shares used in Experiment 2: SUM had the largest sum of returns in comparison to all other shares; FREQUENCY had a lower sum of returns but produced the highest number of returns; the largest single returns were reported for PEAK and AVERAGE-AVERAGE differed from PEAK with respect to a lower frequency of returns and, therefore, a higher average of returns; EXPOSE appeared most frequently but always in association with neutral information; and EXPOSE* was presented as often as EXPOSE but as many returns as for SUM and PEAK were reported. For all shares, we ensured that return values did not differ significantly at the beginning and the end of the presentation.
PARTICIPANTS AND DESIGN
Eighty-four students (59 women, 25 men; M age = 23.1 years) of different majors at the University of Heidelberg volunteered for an experiment called "advertising research" and were paid 15 DEM for their participation. Exposure to the different return distributions was again the crucial factor and was varied on six levels within subjects. Accordingly, each participant was presented with the return distributions of the six target shares as described in the Material section.
Moreover, we introduced two between-subjects factors-Focus of Attention and Mode of Attitude Measurement-to test for the robustness of the effects obtained in Experiment 1. Participants were either instructed to concentrate primarily on the share information or primarily on the ads. Mode of Attitude Measurement also was varied on two levels (comparative vs. absolute). In the comparative mode condition, all shares appeared together on the screen when attitude judgments were assessed. The participant's entries on the rating scales remained visible until all shares were rated. In the absolute mode condition, shares appeared consecutively on the screen. They were rated one after another and inspection of previous ratings was not possible. Altogether, this resulted in a 6 × 2 × 2 (Share × Focus of Attention × Mode of Measurement) design with repeated measurement on the first factor. The participants were randomly assigned to one of the four between-subjects conditions. The experiment was conducted in small groups consisting of 4 participants at most.
PROCEDURE
Participants were seated in front of a PC monitor. The working stations were separated from each other by fold-ing screens. An initial instruction appeared on the monitor and also was read aloud by a female experimenter. In the instructions, it was stated that the experiment was concerned with the human capacity to simultaneously process multiple sources of information. Specifically, it would be investigated how efficient TV ads are if at the same time another kind information is shown. At this point, two different versions of the instructions were used to manipulate the focus of attention. In one condition, the focus of attention was placed on the ads. Participants were instructed to concentrate on the ads and were told that they were to answer some questions about the ads later. In addition, they were requested to read the information appearing in the running captions aloud. This request was announced as a secondary task to constrain participants' information-processing capacities. In the other condition, attention was directed toward the share information. Participants were instructed to concentrate on the return values because they were to answer questions about the shares later. They also were asked to read the information about the shares aloud.
After this instruction, some general questions about the attitudes toward TV ads appeared on the screen to let participants practice the use of three kinds of interactive devices that were later used to measure the dependent variables (i.e., a multiple-choice table, a numberpad, and a scroll bar for attitude measurement). When the participants had finished this task, they were asked to turn their seats around and to watch the commercials and the running caption on a 70-cm TV screen. To ensure that the participants did not distract each other by reading aloud, they were equipped with sound deadening headphones through which only the original sound of the commercials was audible. The videotaped ads lasted about 15 mins. After watching the video, the participants returned to their working stations and were asked to evaluate each of the six shares and two control shares about which no information was given before. They had to intuitively judge each share on a vertical scroll bar with the endpoints labeled good at the top and bad at the bottom. They were forced to respond within 8 secs. After 6 secs, a visual warning signal appeared at the top of the screen.
As a second between-subjects factor, we varied the mode of attitude measurement. The scroll bars for each share appeared exclusively on the screen in the absolutemode condition, and all scrollbars were visible simultaneously in the comparative-mode condition. In both conditions, participants were to evaluate the shares in the same fixed order and the time limits for judgments were held constant for each share. In the compare condition, the scroll bars of the eight shares were activated consecutively from the left to the right. After a judgment had been made, the final position of the bar was kept on the screen so that participants could always inspect their previous ratings. After having judged the last share, participants had the opportunity to readjust their judgments for all shares. In this phase, they could work at their own pace. Actually, only a minority made use of this possibility and no significant differences in their evaluations resulted from this change.
After attitude assessment, participants had to estimate frequency of returns, average, peak, and sum of returns for each share by means of a mouse-controlled numberpad. Finally, the participants had to answer 20 multiplechoice questions referring to the content of the ads (e.g., the brand names of perfumes that appeared in the video). Furthermore, they had to rate how familiar they were with share investing. At the end of the session, participants were probed for suspicion, debriefed, and paid.
Results
Postexperimental interviews revealed that none of the participants was suspicious about the cover stories and the procedure. A few participants reported an interest in the share issue in general or the fact that they were familiar with share investing on the stock market. Exclusion of these cases from data did not alter any of the results. Consequently, we included all 84 cases in the analyses reported below. Again, we did not obtain any effects for gender and age. NOTE: Shares were labeled after that feature by which it dominates the others (e.g., SUM, FREQUENCY, PEAK, AVERAGE, EXPOSE, EXPOSE*).
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CHECK FOR THE ATTENTION MANIPULATION
Half of the participants was instructed to primarily focus on the ads, whereas the other half was to focus on the outcome information of the shares. The knowledge questions about the ads, administered after the attitude judgment, provided a measure for the attention manipulation. Participants who were instructed to attend to the ads answered 51.5% (chance = 33.3%) of the questions correctly. In the other condition, only 41.1% of questions were answered correctly. This difference is significant according to a Mann-Whitney-U test, U(84) = 2317.0, p < .01. This shows that the attention manipulation was effective. The absolute difference between the proportions of correctly answered questions may appear to be somewhat small. Pretests, however, revealed that even those participants who watched the ads in the absence of a dual-task manipulation were not able to address more than 60% of questions correctly. With respect to this empirically obtained ceiling value, the difference between the two experimental conditions is quite substantial because it covers almost 20% of the range of the shortened measurement scale.
ATTITUDE JUDGMENTS
The attitudinal responses on the scroll bar were measured on a scale from -5 (bad) to +5 (good). The empirical neutral point of the scale was slightly below the scale midpoint as evident from the average evaluations of the control shares (M = -0.73, SD = 1.45). Mean attitude judgments for the six target shares appear in Table 3 . The data were subjected to a 2 × 2 × 6 (Attention × Measure × Share) ANOVA with the last being a repeated measurement factor. As in the previous experiment, we again obtained a highly significant effect for the share factor, F(5, 400) = 10.05, p < .01. Neither the attention manipulation nor the variation of the mode of measurement (absolute vs. comparative) produced a significant effect (all Fs < 1.7). For further analyses, the data were collapsed over these two factors. t tests revealed differences between three groups of shares. SUM (M = 1.50) and FREQUENCY (M = 1.12) yielded significantly higher scores than all other shares, ts(83) > 3, ps < .01. PEAK (M = 0.48), AVERAGE (M = 0.37), and EXPOSE* (M = 0.64) were liked better than EXPOSE (M = -0.30), ts(83) > 2, ps < .05. No other significant differences were found. As in Experiment 1, SUM was rated best. However, the difference in subjective valence between SUM and FRE-QUENCY (which had the highest frequency of returns) did not reach an acceptable level of significance.
MEMORY JUDGMENTS
Participants estimated the average, the frequency, and the peak of returns for each share. For each estimate, we performed a 2 × 2 × 6 ANOVA with attention and attitude measure as between-subjects factors and share as a within-subjects factor. The only effect obtained was a main effect for the share factor on the peak estimates, F(5, 400) = 3.09, p < .01. However, a look at the average peak returns as estimated by the participants revealed that this effect did not stem from accurate memory (see right side of Table 2 ).
Discussion
The present results replicate the findings of Experiment 1 and also strongly corroborate our central hypothesis, which states that accumulative operations are dominant in implicit attitude formation. Moreover, the findings obtained clearly rule out the alternative interpretation of the results from the first study that judgments might have reflected the average rather than the sum of outcome values. Both the share with the highest return average and the one with the highest peak of returns were judged significantly less favorable than the sum winner. These findings were robust against the mode of measurement (absolute vs. comparative) and the focus manipulation of attention. The lack of effect for the focus manipulation in the dual task requires some further consideration. One should have expected that placing the focus on the shares should improve 248 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN memory for outcome exemplars and the characteristics of the outcome distribution. This, however, was clearly not the case, as evident from the null effect of the attention factor on the memory measures. In fact, reading the values from the running caption in addition to watching the ads left almost no capacity for elaborating on the outcome information. In postexperimental interviews, the majority of our participants stated that it was neither possible for them to deliberately evaluate the shares while reading the values nor was it possible for them to remember any particular aspect of the distributions. Most of them had no confidence in their own judgments and were not willing to believe that in fact their judgments were highly systematic. These observations are corroborated by the memory measures and, as reported below, by the difficulty in inducing a reliable exemplar memory in the participants of Experiment 3.
EXPERIMENT 3
As already mentioned in the introduction, we assume that implicitly formed value accounts are very easily accessible in memory and thus provide a basic source for evaluative judgments. Presumably, such accounts of implicitly formed attitudes may be automatically evoked whenever the attitude object is encountered. Therefore, attitude judgments should be based on value accounts, especially if cognitive capacities are constrained (e.g., due to time pressure). To test this idea, we had to provide participants with an alternative basis for judgment; for example, with memories of concrete return values. Due to the information overload in our paradigm, this is quite difficult to achieve. After a series of pretests, we decided to employ a very strong manipulation to enhance the memory for concrete events. Specifically, we directly asked participants to remember certain return values highlighted in red on the running caption. This procedure is actually highly demanding in that it provokes the individual to use only this information in subsequent judgment. However, retrieval of explicit knowledge (e.g., return exemplars) from memory takes time (e.g., Schimmack, 1997; Verplanken, Hofstee, & Janssen, 1998) , whereas feelings of positivity and negativity, respectively, are assumed to be readily available (e.g., Wundt, 1907; Zajonc, 1968 Zajonc, , 1980 . Accordingly, we varied time pressure during judgment as an independent variable to trigger the use of either base of knowledge. In the absence of time pressure, we expected attitude judgments to reflect the values of the returns, which were made salient during encoding. Under time pressure, however, individuals should not be able to retrieve these exemplars from memory and, therefore, should rely on their value accounts.
Method PARTICIPANTS AND DESIGN
The sample consisted of 62 undergraduate students of different subject matters of the University of Heidelberg (32 women and 30 men; M age = 23.2 years). They participated in an experiment titled "TV-commercials" and received 15 DEM for their participation. They received information about the returns of two focal shares (together with four distractor shares). For the first focal share, a return with a high value was highlighted. An especially low return value was highlighted for second focal share. Half of the participants had to make subsequent attitude judgments within a time limit of 6 secs, whereas the other half made judgments without time constraints. Time pressure and salient return (high vs. low) yielded a 2 × 2 factorial design, with the last one being a within-subjects factor. Participants were randomly assigned to the experimental groups.
MATERIAL
Participants watched the same set of TV ads as in the previous study. Again, outcome information appeared simultaneously on a running caption at the bottom of the screen. Sum of returns of the two focal shares amounted to 700 and 600, respectively. At the end of the running caption, single returns of both shares were made salient by changing the color from yellow to red. Most important, the salient returns were 10 for the SUM winner and 50 for the SUM loser. Counterconfounding sum and salient peak of returns allows us to determine which kind of information (value account vs. exemplar memory) people may have relied on in making their judgments. If judgments are based on value accounts, people should judge the SUM winner (sum 700/salient return 10) more positively than the SUM loser (600/50). This pattern should reverse if judgments are based on explicit exemplar memory.
PROCEDURE
The procedure was virtually the same as in the condition of Experiment 2, in which the focus of attention was directed toward the ads. However, there were three important changes. First, participants were told to memorize the values of those returns that appeared in red color on the running caption. This part of the instruction was repeated after a practice task. Second, in the timeconstrained condition, subjects were forced to make their attitude judgments within 6 secs. In the other condition, no time limits were used but judgments could not be made before 6 secs (the cursor was blocked on the scroll bar for 6 secs). The third deviation from Experiment 2 was that we employed some new measures of explicit knowledge about the shares' returns. In a set of multiple-choice tasks, participants had to check which of the presented shares had the largest sum, the highest average, and the highest frequency of returns. In addition, they were asked to remember the single returns of the two shares that appeared in red color. They could check one out of four response categories: 10, 30, 50, and "I don't know."
Results
A requirement for the supposed influence of the single salient returns on the judgments being made after 6 secs was that participants had to be able to accurately remember these returns. This was checked by the recognition task, in which they were to recognize the salient return for both shares. Only 12 of the 62 participants had chosen the correct returns for both shares and 24 gave no correct answer at all. The data are reported only for those participants who had chosen at least one correct alternative (n = 17 within 6 sec and n = 21 after 6 sec). Table 4 includes mean attitude judgments for the two focal shares in the two experimental groups. These data were subjected to a 2 × 2 ANOVA with time pressure (within vs. after 6 secs) as a between-subjects factor and share (700/10 vs. 600/50) as a within-subjects factor. A 2 × 2 ANOVA revealed a main effect for share that was close to statistical significance, F(1, 36) = 3.78, p < .06, and a significant interaction between time pressure and share, F(1, 36) = 4.11, p < .05. According to our hypotheses, attitude judgments corresponded to the differences in the sum of returns if the participants were time constrained (i.e., the SUM winner was liked better than the SUM loser). This pattern reversed in the absence of time constraints. Judgments corresponded to the differences in the shares' return exemplars (i.e., the SUM loser that holds a higher exemplar return was rated higher than the SUM winner).
ATTITUDE JUDGMENTS
MEMORY JUDGMENTS
Despite the above-mentioned performance on the recognition measure of return exemplars, participants again lacked any valid explicit memory for the characteristics of the distributions. According to χ 2 analysis, no differences occurred in the frequency of choice for all presented shares (targets and foils) with respect to the features of sum of returns, χ 2 (5, N = 38) = 6.62, p > .05, and average return, χ 2 (5, N = 38) = 8.56, p > .05. An effect was found for the frequency of returns, χ 2 (5, N = 38) = 14.10, p < .05, albeit the actual frequency of returns was the same for each share.
Discussion
The results corroborate the hypothesis in all relevant aspects. In the absence of time pressure, attitude judgments reflected the values of the return exemplars, which were made salient during encoding. Under time constraints, in contrast, attitudes tended to reflect the sums of return distributions. This pattern of results suggests that people are prone to rely on their online-formed value accounts if the cognitive resources are constrained. However, when the attitude judgment was delayed, so that people had enough time for deliberation, their attitudes were memory based, reflecting concrete outstanding exemplars of previous experiences. The results of this study converge with the findings obtained by Wilson, Hodges, and LaFleur (1995) . Their participants, when asked to analyze reasons of their impressions of a target person, also were likely to construct a memory-based attitude. To conclude, the third experiment substantiates the postulate that implicitly formed attitudes of outcome values are very easily accessible in memory and, therefore, can determine attitude judgments under time constraints even if relevant exemplar memory has been established. The results again provide evidence for the value-account approach, which assumes summative operations to be dominant in implicit attitude formation.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We conducted three experiments to substantiate the value-account approach to implicit attitude formation. The results of all studies support the assumption that encoding of value-charged stimuli is a sufficient condition to initiate implicit online formation and storage of an attitude about the target object. We termed the hypothetical memory structure "value account" to mirror the notion that the underlying process of information integration is accumulative. Indeed, the results converge in corroborating the assumption that the cognitive apparatus is capable of implicitly performing two kinds of operations that adhere to the basic arithmetic principles of counting and adding. Moreover, we made predictions about the conditions under which attitude judgments are likely to be based on value accounts. The third experiment provides evidence for the prediction that attitude judgments are based on value accounts especially if cognitive capacities are constrained by time pressure.
AVERAGING VERSUS SUMMATION
As predicted, attitude judgments were not sensitive to the average of outcome values (cf. Experiment 2). This finding deserves some discussion because information integration in attitude formation often is thought to be best described by an averaging model and its variants (e.g., Anderson, 1981; Massaro & Friedmann, 1990) . There is at least one possible explanation for the null effect in our studies. Performing averaging operations basically requires memory records both for the (weighted) sum of outcome values and for sample size. Furthermore, these two parameters have to be integrated at the end of the presentation. In this respect, averaging in a serial presentation requires a great deal of computational effort mainly at the end of the sequence when average values have to be calculated for all objects at once (e.g., for 5 shares as in Experiment 1). In a parallel presentation format, however, averaging operations are presumably easier to perform because the order in which the information is processed can be determined individually so that average values can be computed for one object after another. In fact, many studies providing evidence for averaging have presented all pieces of information together at the same time (e.g., Anderson, 1981) . Consequently, participants can easily screen the whole value matrix and evaluate one object after another. A variant of the averaging model is the peak-and-end rule as put forward by Kahnemann and colleagues (e.g., Kahnemann et al., 1993) . In our experiments, outstanding exemplars in the distribution of returns had no reliable impact on implicit attitude formation. Results of Experiment 2 clearly show that the shares having the highest sum of returns were rated more favorably than the share with the highest peak return. Given that end values in the distributions were held constant in our experiments, these findings challenge the notion that retrospective evaluations follow a peak-and-end rule. On the other hand, our results are in line with a number of models that also assume that integration of evaluative information is summative. Common to these approaches is the idea that value-charged events are accounted and that these accounts are continuously updated over time. Furthermore, these accounts are assumed to be easily accessible and to have a strong impact on judgment and choice. Such models have been put forward in the political sciences (Lodge, Steenbergen, & Brau, 1995) , clinical psychology (Gottman, 1994) , animal learning research (e.g., Davis et al., 1993; Hull, 1943) , and decision making (Betsch, 1995) .
Both approaches, averaging and summation, have received empirical support. One could assume that summative operations might be dominant in implicit information aggregation and under information overload. Averaging rules might be employed when the individual has enough time and cognitive resources available to explicitly evaluate a limited number of pieces of information. Although this idea is compatible with the findings in Experiment 3, it is yet mere speculation and deserves further research.
WERE ATTITUDES IMPLICITLY FORMED ONLINE?
Our experimental paradigm ensured that explicit attitude formation was unlikely to occur. Except in one condition of Experiment 2, participants did not intend to form attitudes during encoding of return information because they expected to be questioned about the ads later. The encoding of returns was framed to serve as a secondary, distractor task. Furthermore, participants had to process between 75 and 150 pieces of return information that were rapidly presented on a running caption. In fact, keeping pace with the presentation itself absorbs a great deal of cognitive resources so that it is almost impossible for participants to explicitly make online judgments during encoding. Memory tests corroborated this notion. Indeed, participants were not able to reliably retrieve any concrete information about the shares. This was true even for the condition in Experiment 2, in which participants were instructed to focus their attention on the shares. Furthermore, participants spontaneously reported in postexperimental interviews to have lacked any concrete knowledge about the shares presented. Often they discredited their own judgments with the argument that these would be based on feelings rather than knowledge. Taken together, we are confident that it was impossible for our participants to calculate the sum of returns explicitly during encoding.
LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS OF FURTHER RESEARCH
Finally, some remarks are in order to point out the limitations of our findings. First, we speculated that averaging may be likely to occur in explicit attitude formation, whereas summative processes are at work in implicit information integration. In a couple of recent studies, we have already received some preliminary support for this notion (Betsch, Plessner, Gütig, & Schwieren, 1999 ) but additional work is needed to determine the context conditions that instigate averaging processes in attitude formation. Second, we have yet only touched the surface of the phenomenon of implicit attitude formation. In another line of research, we go deeper into this issue and investigate to what degree people are able to voluntarily control the influence of implicitly formed value accounts on their attitude judgments (Plessner, Haberstroh, & Betsch, 2000) . Third, we have considered only one attribute domain in the above studies. Hence, one could ague that the findings might be domain specific and should not be rashly generalized. Nonetheless, since conducting the present research, we have obtained preliminary evidence that the results replicate the domain of political attitudes (Plessner, Betsch, Schwieren, & Schallies, 2000) . Fourth, we exclusively var-ied gains in the return distributions. Future investigations must be undertaken as to whether losses are implicitly processed in a similar way. Fifth, we did not vary trend or pattern characteristics in the outcome distributions. Due to the fact that recent contributions to this issue mostly consider explicit processes of judgment and decision making (e.g., Ariely, 1998; Schmitt & Kemper, 1996) , it surely would be worthwhile to study trend and pattern effects in implicit attitude formation.
